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Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have
had the effect of enormously increasing the power of the National
Government, particularly as relates to the control of economic affairs,
the regulation of labor conditions, the control and regulation of interstate commerce and the power of taxation. Other decisions have had
the effect of increasing the power of State governments in certain respects, particularly in dealing with economic affairs.
How have these great and fundamental changes .been brought
about? Mainly by the application of theories of constitutional construction which differ substantially from those by which the court was
guided in earlier cases.
The original conception of judicial review was that the courts
should compare the applicable clause of the Constitution with a challenged statute and from a consideration of the words alone, decide
whether the two were in conflict. This was the view of Hamilton as
expressed in "The Federalist"; 1 and this line of reasoning was adopted
by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison2 without discussing the serious
difficulties which have troubled other judges and other jurists, especially in Europe, arising from the fact that the function of the American courts may involve setting aside a legislative act.3
In United States v. Fisher et al.,4 however, the court held that it
must consider facts related to the subject in hand and not merely the
words of the Constitution and the statute. In this case Marshall for
the first time advanced the doctrine that "Congress must possess the
choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are
in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution." 5 This thought was further elaborated in Marshall's great opint B. L., 1896, Earlham College; LL. B., 1899, University of Pennsylvania; member
of the Philadelphia Bar.
i. THE FmERAwIsT, No. 78 (Hallowell's ed. 1857) 357 et $eq.
2. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 6o (18o3).
3. See THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (Bost. 1901) 96, ioi, in which the great Chief
Justice is gently chided by Professor Thayer for what he concedes to be important
omissions in his treatment of the subject. Other cases and contemporary expressions
of opinion on this point are collected by Professor Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law (igo8) LEGAL EssAYs L4, 15. The
theory that the court's function is limited to examining the words of the statute and the
Constitution has persisted, with some unacknowledged exceptions, almost to the present
day. See opinion of the court in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312,
8o L. Ed.477 (1936).
4. 2 Cranch 358, 2 L. Ed. 304 (1805).
5. Id. at 396, 2 L. Ed. at 317.
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ion in McCulloch v. Maryland,6 in which he made it clear that the
court, in deciding whether Congress had selected a lawful method of
exercising a constitutional power, must consider not only the written
words but also the condition of the nation and its needs. The Constitution is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs"; 7 Congress must have
the choice of means for carrying into execution any power granted to
it by the Constitution and any means "appropriate," "plainly adapted,"
and "really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government" are constitutional. 8
In all of this there is no suggestion that the court will do other
than determine for itself upon the evidence before it or upon facts of
general knowledge whether the means chosen by Congress are "conducive," "plainly adapted," or "really calculated to effect" the end
sought.
But very early another principle appears by which the court is
guided in passing upon the constitutionality of a law. This principle
was referred to by Chief Justice Tilghman, of Pennsylvania, in 18 11 as
well settled. He said it was assumed by all courts of reputation "that
an act of legislature is not to be declared void, unless the violation of
the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable
doubt." 9
There are many cases which so hold. What is the significance of
this rule? If the court comparing the Constitution with the law finds
that the latter is in conflict with the former, why not say so, and hold
the law void, without the necessity of further considering whether the
conflict is beyond reasonable doubt? If the case relates to the construction of one of the constitutional clauses which leaves to Congress
the choice of means for execution of a power granted to it, why should
the court, before it can hold a law unconstitutional, find it necessary to
decide not only that the means chosen by Congress are not "plainly
adapted" to the end sought, but that this is so beyond a reasonable
doubt?
The mere fact that, as sometimes said, a decent respect for a
co-ordinate department of government should require the courts to use
great discretion in holding void the acts of such co-ordinate department
does not sufficiently explain. The true reason for the rule is rather to
6.
7.
8.
9.

4 Wheaton 36, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
Id. at 415, 4 L. Ed. at 6o3.
Id. at 421, 423, 4 L. Ed. at 605.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binney 117, 123 (1811).

240

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

be deduced from the peculiar and unique nature of the court's power
under our system to pass upon the validity of an act of legislation.' 0
The function of our courts is more than a mere comparison of
the Constitution and the law; it is a review of the act of a co-ordinate
department which has already passed upon the constitutionality of the
statute and found it valid. Professor James Bradley Thayer says, "the
ultimate question is not what is the true meaning of the Constitution,
but whether legislation is sustainable or not." "This may be a rather extreme way of expressing the matter, but
the fact must be recognized that the Constitution is equally binding on
legislature and on court, and that when the legislative body has passed
the law it has thereby expressed its judgment that it is constitutional.
The courts, therefore, in considering the question whether a legislative act is valid, which Marshall said could not be approached "without a deep sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision," 12 are really considering not entirely what their
own view of the meaning of the statute and the Constitution may be,
but whether the conclusion of the legislature is clearly wrong beyond
all doubt. The attitude of the court is not unlike that of a court of
appeal in reviewing the verdict of a jury. The verdict will not be set
aside if there is any substantial evidence to support it, even though the
court of appeal may disagree with it.
This principle that an act of legislature will not be set aside as
unconstitutional, except in a very clear case, has been somewhat expanded in recent years. Until quite recently the so-called conservative
wing of the Supreme Court, while affirming the doctrine that in cases
of doubt the statute must not be overturned, held that the doubt must
be a doubt in the minds of the judges themselves, and that if a judge
was clear in his own mind that a law was in violation of the Constitution, it was his duty to so declare, no matter what other men might
think. This view of the case was well expressed by Mr. Justice Sutherland in his dissenting opinion in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish. 3 He said that the judge, in passing upon the validity of a
statute, "discharges a duty imposed upon hin, which cannot be consummated justly by an automatic acceptance of the views of others
which have neither convinced, nor created a reasonable doubt in, his
mind."
io. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional

Law (i9o8) LEGAL ESSAYS
ii. Id. at 3o.

I.

12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 400, 4 L. Ed. 579, 6oo (i81). See
also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162 (18io).

13. 300 U. S. 379, 401, 57 Sup. Ct 578, 586, 8i L. Ed. 703, 714 (1936).
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On the other hand, certain of the Justices of the Supreme Court
in prior years had expressed the opinion that it was the duty of the
judge, at least in certain classes of cases, not merely to decide whether
he had a doubt in his own mind, but whether a reasonable man could
hold such a doubt. Possibly the earliest expression of this thought is
contained in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in the much
discussed case of Lochner v. New York, 14 in which the majority of
the court held invalid a law limiting the hours of labor in bakeries to
ten hours a day. It was held that the statute violated liberty of contract. Mr. Justice Holmes said: 1
"I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law."
In Coppage v. Kansas,'0 dissenting from a decision of the majority
declaring invalid a Kansas statute making it a misdemeanor for an
employer to require an employee to agree not to become or remain a
member of a labor organization during the time of his employment,
Mr. Justice Holmes said, referring to the belief of a workman that he
could not secure a fair contract unless he belonged to a labor union,
that if that belief "whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man," it may be enforced by law and is not a violation of liberty
of contract.

17

Running all through these dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice
Holmes is the thought that the court was not warranted in holding
invalid legislation regulating economic conditions if a reasonable man
could believe that such restrictions were no infringement of liberty.
Later Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo
expressed themselves in a somewhat similar way. Mr. Justice Brandeis,
in New State Ice Company v. Liebmann,'8 in dissenting from the conclusion that legislative regulation of the manufacture of ice was not
warranted because this business was not one affected with a public
interest, said that while the declaration of the legislature that a business
14. 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905).

15. Id. at 76, 25 Sup. Ct. at 547, 49 L. Ed. at 949.
I6. 236 U. S. I,27, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 248, 59 L. Ed. 441, 45, (1915).

17. See also dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in Adair v. United States,
2o8 U. S. i6I, 191, 28 Sup. Ct 277, 287, 52 L. Ed. 436, 449 (19o8) ; Adldns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 570-571, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 404, 67 L. Ed. 785, Soi-8o2
(1923) ; and Tyson and Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 446, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 433, 71 L.
Ed. 718, 729 (1927).
18. 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (x932).
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is of a public nature and subject to regulation is not conclusive and is
subject to judicial review, the conclusion of the legislature must be
pustained if it could reasonably be decided that the business was of
that character.'"
In Tyson and Bro. v. Banton,20 the court held invalid a New York
statute regulating the resale of theatre tickets. Mr. Justice (now Chief
Justice) Stone said in a dissenting opinion that the case turned "upon
considerations of economics about which there may be reasonable differences of opinion. Choice between these views takes us from the
judicial to the legislative field. The judicial function ends when it is
determined that there is basis for legislative action in a field not withheld from legislative power by the Constitution as interpreted by the
decisions of this court."
These views are traceable to the influence of Professor Thayer.
He wrote in 1893 in the essay above referred to 21 that:
"The judicial function is merely that of fixing the outside border
of reasonable legislative action, the boundary beyond which the
taxing power, the power of eminent domain, police power, and
legislative power in general, cannot go without violating the prohibitions of the constitution or crossing the line of its grants." 22
In a note to the same volume he says that in construing the commerce clause, the courts cannot control a legislative decision as to
whether a given subject falls within national or state power "except in
cases so clear that there cannot reasonably be two opinions." 23
The provisions of the Constitution which lend themselves to a
construction of this kind are those which contain general clauses, the
precise content or application of which may require the exercise of
judgment not only as to the technical meaning of the language used,
but as to the conditions to which it applies. This involves a consideration of fact as well as law.
Congress has power "To lay and collect Taxes,

.

.

to pay the

Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States." What is the general welfare and when may the
collection of taxes or the spending of the moneys raised by taxation
be legitimately held valid as a provision for the general welfare?
Conigress has power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States." What is commerce and may the scope
of its meaning vary from year to year?
ig. Id. at 284-285, 52 Sup. Ct. at 377, 76 L. Ed. at 757.
20. 273 U. S. 418, 454, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 436, 71 L. Ed. 718, 733 (1927).
21. Op. cit. supra, note I0.
22. Id. at 27.
23.

Id. at 36.

NEW THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

243

The citizens of each State are "entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." What are these privileges
and immunities and are they always the same?
Congress is forbidden to pass any Jaw "abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." May the extent to which these rights are
protected differ at different times, depending upon conditions? 24
No person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property without
due process of the law." What is liberty and what is due process?
Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden. What are cruel
and unusual punishments?
These questions depend in part upon the construction of the words
of the Constitution, and also in some instances upon the sense of the
community as related to these subjects which may change from year to
year.
In the preface to his Cases on Constitutional Law prepared for
Harvard students in 1895, Professor Thayer says:
"The study of Constitutional Law is allied not merely with history, but with statecraft, and with the political problems of our
great and complex national life."
Referring to the labor of judges in this field, he continues:
"Views that seem adequate at the time, are announced, applied,
and developed; and yet, by and by, almost unperceived, they melt
away in the light of later experience, and other doctrines take their
place."
The late Mr. Justice Card6zo expressed the matter in this way:
"Does liberty mean the same thing for successive generations?
May restraints that were arbitrary yesterday be useful and rational and therefore lawful today? May restraints that are arbitrary today become useful and rational and therefore lawful tomorrow?2 I have no doubt that the answer to these questions must be
yes.

.

"From all, this, it results that the content of constitutional

26
immunities fs not constant, but varies from age to age.

24. In this connection it is interesting to note that Alexander Hamilton, in arguing
against the necessity for a bill of rights, said: "What signifies a declaration, that 'the
liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved?' What is the liberty of the press?
Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?
I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine
declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend
on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government." THE
FEDERALIsT, No. 84 (Hallowell's ed. 1857) 394.
25. CARDOZO, THE NATuRE oF THE JuDicA.L PRocEss (1921) 76-77.

26. Id. at 82-83.
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"The courts, then, are free in marking the limits of the
individual's immunities to shape their judgments in accordance
with reason and justice. That does not mean that in judging the
validity of statutes they are free to substitute their own ideas of
reason and justice for those of the men and women whom they
serve. Their standard must be an objective one. In such matters,
the thing that counts is not what I believe to be right. It is what
I may reasonably believe that some other man of normal intellect
and conscience might reasonably look upon as right." 27
This "new conception of the significance of constitutional limitations in the domain of individual liberty" has not "emerged to recognition and to dominance" 25 without a struggle, but the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court have made it clear that the new theory has not
only been accepted but extended by that Court.
In Nebbia v. New York 2 9 it was held that a statute of the State
of New York regulating prices for the sale of milk was valid, although
previous decisions of the court had held that price regulation of businesses not affected with a public interest, as those words had been previously construed, was beyond the power of the legislature as being
violation of liberty of contract. The opinion of the court was based in
large part upon facts which it was said had been disclosed to the court
regarding the condition of the milk business in the State of New York,
and it was held that "guaranty of due process . . . demands only that

the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained. It results that a regulation valid for one sort of
business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or
for the same business under other circumstances, because the reason3 . . .
ableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts0
27. Id. at 88-89.

28. Cardozo, id. at 78. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland in
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 448-449, 450, 54 Sup.
Ct. 231, 244, 78 L. Ed. 413, 434-435 (934), reading in part as follows: "A provision
of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different
thing at another time. . . . This view, at once so rational in its application to the
written word, and so necessary to the stability of constitutional principles, though from
time to time challenged, has never, unless recently, been put within the realm of doubt
by the decisions of this court...... Chief Justice Taney, in Dred Scott v. Sanford,
19 How. 393, 426, said that while the Constitution remains unaltered it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption; that it is not only the
same in words but the same in meaning, 'and as long as it continues to exist in its
present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and
intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted
on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction
would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the

popular opinion or passion of the day."'
29. 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
30. Id. at 525, 54 Sup. Ct. at 510-511, 78 L. Ed. at 950.
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Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only
if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the
legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted
interference with individual liberty." 31
In Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 32 the court sustained a joint resolution of Congress, providing that private obligations
to pay amounts due thereunder in gold coin of a particular weight and
fineness could be discharged by the payment in any coin or currency
which at the time was legal tender. The court held that the resolution
was passed pursuant to the power of Congress to regulate the currency
and to establish the monetary system of the country; that so-called gold
clauses contained in private contracts were an effort to interfere with
the policy of Congress in that connection and were therefore invalid.
The court said that the questions involved in the case came down to a
single point,
"whether the gold clauses do constitute an actual interference with
the monetary policy of the Congress in the light of its broad power
to determine that policy. Whether they may be deemed to be such
an interference depends upon an appraisement of economic conditions and upon determinations of questions of fact. With respect
to those conditions and determinations, the Congress is entitled to
its own judgment. We may inquire whether its action is arbitrary
or capricious, that is, whether it has reasonable relation to a legitimate end."

33

The court finally answered in the negative the question whether the
determination of Congress that these contract clauses were an interfer.ence with its monetary policy
"is so destitute of basis that the interdiction of the gold clauses
must be deemed to be without any reasonable relation to the
monetary policy adopted by the Congress." 34
The final sentence in the court's opinion was:
"We think that it is clearly shown that these clauses interfere with
the exertion of the power granted to the Congress and certainly it
is not established that the Congress arbitrarily or capriciously
decided thaf such an interference existed." 35
31.

Id. at 539, 54 Sup. Ct. at 517, 78 L. Ed. at 958.

U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935).
33. Id. at 311, 55 Sup. Ct. at 417, 79 L. Ed. at 9o4.
34. Id. at 313, 55 Sup. Ct. at 418, 79 L. Ed. at 905.
32. 294

35. Id. at 3X6, 55 Sup. Ct. at 419, 79 L. Ed. at 9o6.

In Perry v. United States,

294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. Ed. 912 (1935), we find the converse of this rul-

ing. The court held that the above noted resolution of Congress, insofar as it undertook to abrogate the gold clause in United States bonds, was "invilid as beyond its
power" and therefore void, although the plaintiff was denied relief on the ground that
he had suffered no damage.
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Something of the same thought was evidently in the mind of the
court in sustaining the validity of the National Labor Relations Act in
NationalLabor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation
and related cases. 36 These cases sustained the power of Congress to
regulate labor relations of companies engaged exclusively in manufacturing within a state on the theory that the manufacture of a product
which was to become a part of the flow of interstate commerce was an
activity which the Court could regulate under its power to regulate
interstate commerce, and that a restraint for the purpose of preventing
what was called an "unjust interference" with the right of contract
between the employer and its employees could not "be considered
arbitrary or capricious."

37

In Wickard et al. v. Filburn,88 the court sustained the revised
Agricultural Adjustment Act as applied to the regulation of the growing of wheat in a case where it was conceded that the grain would not
become a part of interstate commerce but would be consumed on the
premises on the theory that Congress could "properly have considered"
that interstate commerce would be affected thereby. In answer to the
claim that the action of Congress constituted violation of due process,
the court said:
"An Act of Congress is not to be refused application by the courts
as arbitrary and capricious and forbidden by the Due Process
Clause merely because it is deemed in a particular case to work an
inequitable result." 29
In construing the taxing power of the Federal Government, the
court's recent decisions have been along the same lines. In discussing
the question whether a tax was an infringement of the due process and
equal protection clauses, the court said in Carmichaelet al. v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co.: 40
"A legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none.
It may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and
when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest
on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would
support it....

"This restriction upon the judicial function, in passing on the
constitutionality of statutes, is not artificial or irrational. A state
legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution." 41
36.
37.
38.
39.

3oi U. S. I, 49, 58, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 642, 645, 81 L. Ed. 893, 918, 921 (1937).
Id. at 44, 57 Sup. Ct. at 627, 8I L. Ed. at 915.
317 U. S. II1, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 57 (I942).
Id. at 129-13o, 63 Sup. Ct. at 91, 87 L. Ed. at 67.

40. 301 U. S. 495, 57 Sup. Ct. 868, 8I L. Ed. 1245 (937).
41. Id. at 509-510, 57 Sup. Ct. at 872, 8i L. Ed. at 1253.
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In Helvering v. Davis, 42 sustaining the Social Security Act, the

court held that the spending power could be used by Congress in its
discretion "unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment. This is now familiar law. 'When
such a contention comes here we naturally require a showing that by
no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the
wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress,' " 43 and the court
added:
"Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were
narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day
with the well-being of the Nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the times." 44
The theory that the court should have a wider discretion in determining the validity of acts of legislation has been extended in other
directions. Ever since Ex parte Milligan4" it had been the doctrine of
the Supreme Court that the existence of an emergency did not enlarge
the power of Congress. In that case the court, referring to the framers
of the Constitution, said:
"Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would
arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint,
and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed
just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty
would be in peril unless established by irrepealable law." 46
and that
"No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." 47
Nevertheless, in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blais-

dell et al., 48 the court held that a Minnesota act for the rdlief of mortgage debtors, although violating the provision of the Constitution that
42. 301 U. S. 61g, 57 Sup. Ct 904, 8I L. Ed. 1307 (I937).
43. Id. at 640-641, 57 Sup. Ct. at 9o8, 81 L. Ed. at 1315.
44. Id. at 641, 57 Sup. Ct. at 9o8-9o9, 8i L. Ed. at 1315. Other cases expressing

the same principle ate McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S.33,
6o Sup. Ct 388, 84 L. Ed. 565 (940) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310
U. S. 381, 6o Sup. Ct. 907, 84 L. Ed. 1263 (1940), in effect overruling Carter v. Carter

Coal Co., 298 U. S.238, 56 Sup. Ct. 85s, 8o L. Ed. II6o (936) ; United States v.
Darby, 312 U. S. ioo, 6I Sup. Ct 451, 85 L. Ed. 6og (194i), in which the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 was sustained, overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251,
38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. nioi (igx8) ; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 6i Sup. Ct.
862, 85 L. Ed. I3O5 (941),

545,

overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct.

72

L. Ed. 913 (1928) ; and other cases.

48.

290 U.

45. 4 Wall. 2, I8 L. Ed. 281 (1866).
46. Id. at i2o, i8L. Ed. at 295.
47. Id. at 12r, 18 L. Ed. at 295.

S.398, 54 Sup. Ct 231, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934).
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no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, was
valid. The real basis of the court's decision is contained in the following words:
"The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while,-a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society." 49
Although the court said, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, that it did
not depart from the doctrine that emergency "does not create power,"
it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the effect of the court's
decision, if not to create power, was to permit its exercise in a manner
forbidden by the Constitution in view of the economic emergency existing in the State of Minnesota.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, in his dissenting opinion, demonstrated
beyond question that the conditions of emergency existing at the time
the law was passed were no worse than those which existed at the time
the Constitution was adopted. He concluded that the law must necessarily be held to be a violation of the Constitution. The court, however,
holding that the contract clause was not "an absolute and utterly unqualified restriction of the State's protective power," concluded that
"this legislation is clearly so reasonable as to be within the legislative
competency." 50
Summed up, the conclusion of this case appears to be that when
unusual conditions exist the court may sustain what it conceives to be
a reasonable violation of the Constitution if it believes the law is necessary to maintain the existence of the government.
That these cases denote a substantial departure from principles
previously followed is not open to question. In the construction of
the clauses above noted, the court has, in effect, concluded that legislation will be sustained as constitutional if, taking into consideration
conditions existing at the time, a reasonable man would not necessarily
find it arbitrary or capricious, and it has even extended this doctrine to
cases where there is an admitted violation of a constitutional clause if
in the opinion of the court the act may be considered to be a reasonable
device necessary to maintain the integrity of the government.
In reaching the conclusions which it has in the various instances
cited, and others which cannot be discussed within the limits of this
article, the court has disregarded the principle of stare decisis. It has
49. Id. at 435, 54 Sup. Ct at 239, 78 L. Ed. at 427.
50. Id. at 447, 54 Sup. Ct. at 243, 78 L. Ed. at 434.
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overruled its own decisions in numerous cases, some of which had only
recently been decided. In some instances the change of view by the
court was due to a change of opinion of individual judges. The decision
of the court in Nebbia v. New York 5 in effect overruled New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann,5r2 decided only two years earlier. This involved
a change of view by Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Roberts,
they having voted in the majority in both cases. West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish"' overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital5 4 and also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,," decided only ten months earlier.
In this case Mr. Justice Roberts had changed his view.
Chief Justice Hughes delivering the opinion for the court in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish56 attempts to distinguish the Tipaldo case
on the ground that in the earlier case the Supreme Court had not been
asked to overrule Adkins v. Children's Hospital,5 7 but had only been
asked to distinguish it. This distinction, or rather explanation, it is
said by Professor Thomas Reed Powell, "is a story that should bring
blushes to those who joined in the official narration;" " and one of the
present members of the court, in a book published shortly before he
became a member of the court, referred to the explanation as "a bit of
face-saving." 59 Many cases have been overruled in principle, in some
instances without citing them or explaining the reasons for the change
of view.60
That these decisions have had the effect of enlarging legislative
power in certain fields by practically nullifying constitutional restrictions upon it is *clear. Professor Corwin, of Princeton, in an able and
thoughtful discussion of many of these new decisions, concludes that
"Not again for a long time will the Court hold void an act of
Congress against which nothing can be said by way of constitutional objection except that it invades the accustomed.field of state
power and tends to upset the Federal Equilibrium. Not again for
a long time will it set aside an act of Congress-any act that Congress is likely to pass-on the ground solely that it deprives persons of liberty 'unreasonably', and so without 'due process of law'.
U. S. 5d2, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct 371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (1932).
53. 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937).
54. 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923).
51. 291
52. 285

55. 298 U.
.56. 300 U.
57. 261 U.
58. Powell,
529, 549.
59.

S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 8o L. Ed. 1347 (1936).
S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937).
S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923).
Some Aspects of American ConstitutionalLaw

JAcxsox, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

(1940)

(1941)

53 HARv.L. Rav.

208.

6o. For example, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S.502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed.
940 (1934), overruled Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876), and a long
line of cases following it, without any real explanation of the reasons for doing so.
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In a word, those doctrines of constitutional law which have been
hitherto the chief sources of its broadly supervisory powers over
congressional legislation have simply dried up, at least for the
time being. If they still retain the spark of life, it is at least dormant." 61
Professor Corwin continues that this is only part of the story and
gives it as his opinion that "the Court dominated by Mr. Roosevelt's
appointees-seems deliberately bent on minimizing its constitutional
function, not only in the field of congressional legislation, but more
generally." 62
The view now held by the Supreme Court as to the proper method
of construing certain clauses of the Constitution appears to involve the
conclusion not only that they may be applied to new conditions as they
arise, but that they may by construction be given a new and extended
meaning.6 3 This is not in accord with views formerly held. Chief
61. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (194)
I08.
62. Id. at 1o9. This view of Professor Corwin may be due in part to the fact that

some members of the court seem to have a strong bias against the doctrine of judicial
review. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the opinion of the court in Minersville

School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 6oo, 6o Sup. Ct. ioio, 1015, 84 L. Ed. 1375,

1382 (1940) refers to judicial review as being "itself a limitation on popular government," and the volume above referred to, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, note
59 supra, written by Mr. Justice Jackson before his elevation to the bench, taken as a
whole is a sharp criticism of the court for having unjustifiably, as he thought, nullified
acts of Congress; he depicts the court as having wrongfully assumed power to nullify
the aspirations of democracy. In discussing the case of Ashton v. Cameron County
District, 298 U. S. 513, 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 8o L. Ed. 1309 (1936), he says, at p. 166:
"This case illustrated the reckless extent to which the Court was interfering with the
economic affairs of the country," and later, at p. 17o, he refers to the court as "not
simply anti-Congress," but "anti-Government." These references, of course, were to
the so-called "old court" prior to the new appointments, but illustrate the point of view
then held by one of its critics. It is argued by Professor Commager, of Columbia
University, in a recent article that judicial review has no value and is only a hindrance
to democracy. Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy (1943) 19 VA. Q. REv.
417.
63. The critics of the "old court" complained that it had abrogated
to itself the
powers of a third house of legislature; that it struck down laws because it did not
approve of them, not because they were in violation of the Constitution. The new
theory accepts and attempts to rationalize this conception of the power of the court in
certain fields. It does and must legislate, it is said, otherwise the Constitution cannot
be adapted to changing conditions. See CAanozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAl,
PROCESS (1921) 82 et seq.

This theory has been applied so far principally to laws which regulate economic
affairs, including labor conditions, or which relate to taxation; recent cases in which
laws were alleged to infringe the constitutional protection of freedom of speech or of
the press have been discussed and decided along conventional lines with due regard for
precedent.
Even on this point, however, there appears to be a difference of opinion among the
justices of the court. For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education, etc.,
et al. v. Barnette et al., 319 U. S. 624, 639, 666-7, 63 Sup. Ct 1178, 1186, 1198, 87 L.
Ed. 1171, 1179, 1193 (1943), a "salute the Flag" case, which overruled Minersville
School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 6o Sup. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375 (1940), de-

cided only a few months previously, Mr. Justice Jackson, delivering the opinion of the
court, said at p. 1179: "Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears
when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State
to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process
test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have
a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and
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Justice Marshall, in Osborn v. The Bank of the United States,6 4 said:
"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.
When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the
court to follow it. Jtidicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other
words, to the will of the law." 65
Of this passage Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote in the volume above
referred to:
of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state
may lawfully protect. It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State it is the more specific limiting principles of
the First Amendment that finally govern this case."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, however, in his dissenting opinion, applied the theory of
reasonableness as envisioned by the legislature of Virginia to the case before the court.
He said at p. 1193: "I think I appreciate fully the objections to the law before us. But
to deny that it presents a question upon which men might reasonably differ appears to
me to be intolerance. And since men may so reasonably differ, I deem it beyond my
constitutional power to assert my view of the wisdom of this law against the view of
the State of West Virginia."
In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 11o, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375, 139o, 87 L.
Ed. 1337, 1352 (1943), the court applied the theory of reasonableness to orders of military authorities restricting the activities of citizens of Japanese ancestry, which were
attacked as a violation of the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. The case went
strictly on the ground of military necessity, but there were expressions in the opinions
of some of the justices indicating that it must not be supposed from the decision of the
court that "provisions of the Constitution protecting essential liberties are suspended
by the mere existence of a state of war. It has been frequently stated and recognized
by this Court that the war power, like the other great substantive powers of government, is subject to the limitations of the Constitution." Concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Murphy, citing Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866).
In Sknner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S.535, 62 Sup. Ct. iiio, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942),
the court, in holding invalid a statute of Oklahoma providing for the sterilization of
habitual criminals, applied its own judgment and did not accept the judgment of the
legislature of Oklahoma as to whether the law made invidious discriminations in its
application or violated the due process clause in not affording an adequate hearing to
a criminal before the sentence of sterilization was imposed.
64. 9 Wheaton 738, 866, 6 L. Ed. 204, 234 (1824).

65. A late expression of this view is contained in the dissenting opinion of Mr.

Justice Sutherland in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 402-403, 404,
He said: "It is urged that
57 Sup. Ct. 578, 587, 81 L. Ed. 703, 714, 715 (937).

the question involved should not receive fresh consideration, among other reasons, because of 'the economic conditions which have supervened'; but the meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events. We frequently
are told in more general-words that the Constitution must be construed in the light of
the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of living words
that apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite true. But
to say, if that be intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they
did not mean when written-that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which
they would have applied then-is to rob that instrument of the essential element which
continues it in force as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents,
have made it otherwise. . . . The judicial function is that of interpretation; it does
not include the power of amendment under the guise of interpretation. To miss the
point of difference between the two is to miss all that the phrase 'supreme law of the
land' stands for and to convert what was intended as inescapable and enduring mandates into mere moral reflections."
In this opinion Mr. Justice Sutherland cites a number of authorities including
Cooley on the Constitution, which fully sustain the view he expresses on this point.
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"It has a lofty sound; it is well and finely said; but it can never
be more than partly true." 66
A recent author asserts that the meaning of the Constitution actually changes with the passing of the years and cites in support of his
thesis the often quoted remark of Charles Evans Hughes that "we are
under a constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it
is." 67 One is reminded of the cynical political quip of some years ago:
"What is the Constitution between friends ?" and of the opening sentence of Sir Francis Bacon's Essay on Truth: "What is Truth? said
jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer." 68
The substance of the new theory of constitutional construction is
that the guarantees of personal liberty, or at least some of them, and
even certain clauses which mark the division of powers between the
Federal and State governments have no definite or fixed meaning, but
that their content may vary from time to time depending upon the
changing condition of affairs; that any statute purporting to regulate
economic affairs or labor conditions, or to promote the general welfare, or in certain other fields to which reference has been made, will
not be held unconstitutional if a reasonable man could believe on "any
conceivable state of facts" that it is not arbitrary and capricious.
Whether a reasonable man could entertain such a belief would depend
in part at least upon prevailing public opinion which changes from day
to day. Since the legislature has passed the law and the Executive has
approved it, what becomes of the constitutional guaranty? Are the
legislators and executives (or at least some of them) not reasonable
men? Is the court therefore powerless to interfere? 69
This conception of the place of the judiciary in the American system of constitutional law is quite different from that originally held by
our early jurists.
It has been recognized from the foundation of our government
that the only way constitutional restrictions on the power of the Legislative or the Executive departments can be enforced is through the
courts, and that maintaining the integrity of the Constitution depends
66. C.awozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) i69.
67. ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHAR.ES E. HUGHES (1908) 139. See JACOBUS
TEN BROEK, Use by the U. S. Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constituton
Construction (1939) 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399. In this article the author says at
p. 411: ". . . questions should be considered in the light of present-day conditions

as they actually exist, not in the near darkness of the world as it surrounded the framers, nor yet in the dimming illumination of things as they were in the youth of the justices." The theory of the author seems to be that the sunlight of full understanding
burst upon the world only within the last two or three decades.
68. I BACON, WoRKs (Phila. 1856) I1.
69. judge Cooley points out that the Fourteenth Amendment is "mere nonsense"
if conformity to an act of legislation is in itself due process. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LImTATIONS (7th ed. 1903) 503.
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upon the firmness and honesty of an independent judiciary. Hamilton,
in The Federalist,says:
"But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion
of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of
the constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community." 70
That the Judiciary department is the weakest of the three was
fully recognized and every effort made to make the judges independent.
Some of the early statesmen thought the courts would be unable to perform the duty laid upon them. Mr. Justice Gibson, in Eakin v. Raub 71
said in a dissenting opinion, in which he argued against the power of
judicial review of Acts of Congress:
"Once let public opinion be so corrupt, as to sanction every misconstruction of the constitution, and abuse of power, which the
temptation of the moment may dictate, and the party which may
happen to be predominant, will laugh at the puny efforts of a
dependent power to arrest it in its course."
Of course, if the judges are not strong enough to resist pressure
from the Legislative or Executive departments, or the force of public
opinion, the restraints of the Constitution are weakened or destroyed
altogether. The same thing is true if the court becomes the instrument of a political party or group and shows bias in its decisions, in
which case it "loses its moral authority, and decisions which might be
justified on grounds of policy excite natural indignation and suspicion
when they are seen not to be fully justified on grounds of law." 72
The possibility that the courts might be influenced by political
considerations in rendering decisions was warned against by James
Wilson, who said:
"Nothing is more to be dreaded than maxims of law and reasons of state blended together by judicial authority. Among all
the terrible instruments of arbitrary power, decisions of courts,
whetted and guided and impelled by considerations of policy, cut
with the keenest edge, and inflict the deepest and most deadly
wounds." 73
The Supreme Court of the United States has been accused at
various times in its history of allowing political considerations to influence its judgment. Prior to the Civil War it was commonly believed
7o. THE FmERALST, No. 78 (Hallowell's ed. 1857) 359.
71. 12 S. & R. 330, 355 (1825).
72. DicEy, THE LAw oF THE CoNsTrrtlox (7th ed. 19o8) 172-173.
73. I am indebted to my friend, Theodore W. Reath, Esq., for this statement of
James Wilson, which was made in a lecture at the Law School of the University of
Pennsylvania in 1792.
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that the Supreme Court had become the instrument of the slave power,
and its decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford7 4 was generally ascribed to
that fact. The opinion of the court, perhaps too pointedly, denies that
it was influenced in any way by questions of policy in rendering its
decision, but the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McLean strongly
intimates that "an excited public opinion" had influenced a reversal of
decisions by the Supreme Court of Missouri which the majority opin75
ion held the Supreme Court was bound to follow.

Professor Corwin refers to this decision as of "discreditable character as a judicial utterance," and concludes that while it cannot be
designated a usurpation, it was "a gross abuse of trust by the body
which rendered it." He points out that the Supreme Court was greatly
injured in reputation by the decision, and continues:
"The court itself was conscious of its weakness, yet notwithstanding its prudent disposition to remain in the background, at no time
since Jefferson's first administration has its independence been in
greater jeopardy than in the decade between i86o and 1870; so
slow and laborious was its task of recuperating its shattered
reputation."

76

The decision in the Legal Tender Cases,7 7 overruling Hepburn v.
Griswold,78 after the appointment of two new judges to the bench and
within a very short period of time, was thought to be influenced by
political considerations, and that decision in the opinion of Charles
Evans Hughes "shook popular respect for the court." 79
Justice Hughes also says, referring to the income tax decision in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.: 80
"There can be no objection to a conscientious judge changing his
vote, but the decision of such an important question by a majority
74. 19 How. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1856).
75. Id. at 563, 15 L. Ed. at 766.
76. CORWiN, THE DOcTRixE OF JuDicAL
77. 12 Wall. 457, 2o L. Ed. 287 (1870).
78. 8 Wall. 603, i L. Ed. 513 (1869).
79.

HUGHES,

REVIEW (1914) 157.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928)

52.

At this

point Justice Hughes also says, referring to the fact that the reversal took place so soon
after the original decision: "Stability in judicial opinions is of no little importance in
maintaining respect for the Court's work." The view of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes on
this point seems to have changed prior to his opinion for the court in the case of West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 8I L. Ed. 703 (1936), in
which, as above noted, a case which was decided only ten months before was overruled
after a change of view by one member of the court.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Field, in his dissenting opinion in the
Legal Tender Cases said: "I shall not comment upon the causes which have led to a
reversal of that judgment [Hepburn v. Griswold]. They are patent to every one."
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 634, 2o L. Ed. 287, 339 (1870).
8o. 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759, also 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct.
912, 39 L. Ed. iio8 (1895).
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of one after one judge had changed his vote aroused a criticism of
the Court which has never been entirely stilled." 81
During the period from 1870 to 1930, the court was criticized by

a small but vocal group for decisions which it was said were based in
part upon the views of the .judges upon economic questions rather than
a just construction of the words of the Constitution, but there was never
any contention that the court's decisions had been based upon subservience to the Legislature or the Executive or to popular opinion.
Since 1933 the court has undoubtedly been subjected to tremendous pressure both from the Legislative and Executive departments of
the Government, and particularly during the depths of the depression,
by public opinion, to sustain laws of Congress regulating business within
the states far beyond anything previously attempted and laws of the
States which appeared to violate constitutional clauses for the protection of individuals.
The court itself has not indicated that it was affected by such considerations, but the President, in a magazine article, made the statement
that the change of view by the court prior to any new members of it
having been appointed, was due to what he called "The Supreme Court
Fight," in which he had charged the court with inefficiency and had
proposed a reorganization involving the appointment of enough new
2
justices to overrule the previous decisions of the court.
Professor Corwin, in the volume previously referred to, says:
"Considerably more important, I surmise, in inducing the
Justices--or certain of them-to restudy their position, than the
Court proposal or the homily which was its prologue, was the outcome of the election of 1936, manifesting overwhelming popular
approval of the New Deal .

,, 83

It is, of course, impossible to say what considerations moved the
justices of the "old court" to change their views or the new justices to
sustain laws which would have been held unconstitutional if earlier
decisions had been followed. In the former case it may have been such
considerations as Professor Corwin mentions, or it may have been such
as were suggested by James Bryce, writing fifty years ago:
"The Supreme Court feels the touch of public opinion.
Opinion is stronger in America than anywhere else in the world,
and judges are only men. To yield a little may be prudent, for the
tree that cannot bend to the blast may be broken." 84
8I. HUGHES, THE SUP REME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928) 54.
82. See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Fight Goes On (Sept. i94I) CoLLmR's.
83. CoRiWn, CoSTTUTIONAL REVoLUT N, LTD. (1941) 73.
84. i BRYcE, THE AmEICAN CoMONWZxI.rL
(3d ed. 1895) 273.
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But whatever the reasons may have been for the vote of the individual judges of the court, or whatever the process by which they
reached their conclusions, the question of interest now is the future of
judicial review and whether it can be an effective check upon unconstitutional legislation."5 If the new theory of constitutional construction
has been correctly appraised, it comes very close to leaving the construction of certain clauses of the Constitution to Congress and the Executive for if the test is reasonableness, not as envisioned by the court, but
as it might be envisioned by any normal man at the time the law was
passed, not excluding the members of the legislature who passed it,
there appears to be little room for the court to hold unconstitutional
any act of legislation in certain fields.8"
Under this theory of its duty the court has permitted Congress to
regulate the affairs of individuals in the States in a manner and to an
extent never before believed possible. It is respectfully suggested that
the court may have failed sufficiently to take into consideration the
human tendency of persons in possession of political power to construe
what they want to do as being constitutional. It is universally recognized that restrictions on the power of a Congress and Executive which
they themselves construe would be totally ineffective to prevent unconstitutional action. "I agree," said Hamilton, "that 'there is.no liberty,
if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.' " 7
The framers of our Constitution and their immediate ancestors
had suffered from the exercise of arbitrary power both in America and
in other countries from which they came. They intended to preserve
in the Constitution the great ideals of liberty and equality and to protect
the individual from the exercise of arbitrary power even by the organs
of government which they themselves set up. They also intended to
preserve to the people of the various states the right to manage their
local affairs without interference from the central government except
where the power to do so had been delegated.
85. In this connection it is interesting to note that the state courts in numerous instances have followed decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on Constitutional questions not because they agreed with the reasoning of the decisions, but because they thought it desirable to have the state decisions in harmony with those of the
Federal Courts. See the opinion of the court in Pennsylvania Company v. Scott 346
Pa. 13 (1942), and the very able and spirited dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Drew,
at p. 20.

86. See address by Frank J. Hogan (1939) 64 A. B. A. RE. 478, in which he expresses the opinion that hereafter "the American people must look to the legislature
rather than the judiciary for the preservation of those liberties which can be preserved
only by the observations of limitations upon the exercise of power."
87. THE FEDERALIsT, No. 78 (Hallowell's ed. 1857) 356, citing I MoNTESQUIEu,
SPIRIT oF LAWS 186; Eng. trans. by Nugent (1873) 174.
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There can be no doubt that the means which Congress or a legislature may adopt for carrying out a constitutional power may change
from time to time, so that laws which would be unconstitutional at one
stage of our history may be constitutional at a later date, and vice versa,
but the Constitution itself cannot change in meaning; there must be
some true construction of written words. The court cannot condone
what it deems. to be "reasonable" violations of the Constitution, without in effect altering its words; it cannot surrender its duty to determine upon its own judgment the meaning of constitutional clauses, or
whether a statute is a reasonable and appropriate means of exercising
a power possessed by the legislative body without giving up its function
as the final interpreter of the Constitution.

